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ADDING SMOKE TO THE CLOUD OF
TOBACCO LITIGATION-A NEW PLAINTIFF:
THE INVOLUNTARY SMOKER
Liability of cigarette manufacturers for smoking related diseases has
become a focal point of controversy in the area of products liability. As a
result of the fatal health risks involved with cigarette smoking, commenta-
tors have advocated imposing liability against cigarette manufacturers
under a strict liability theory.' Nevertheless, cigarette smokers have unsuc-
cessfully sued cigarette manufacturers for over two decades. A recent case
in New Jersey marked the tobacco industry's first loss ever in a suit over a
cigarette smoker's death.2 Suits brought by smokers in the 1960s were de-
feated by such defenses as assumption of risk3 and unforeseeable conse-
quences.4 Smoker suits in the 1980s have failed because federal circuit
courts have held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
of 1965 preempts state common law tort actions based on a failure to warn
of the dangers of cigarette smoking.5
I. See generally Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes
be Kicked?, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 195 (1987); Comment, Strict Products Liability on the Move:
Cigarette Manufacturers May Soon Feel the Heat, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1137 (1986).
2. Burne, Cigarette Firm is Found Guilty in Death Suit, Ariz. Republic, June 14,
1988, at Al, col. 5. A federal court jury found Liggett Group, Inc. partially to blame for the
1984 death of the plaintiff who smoked the company's Chesterfields and L & M filter ciga-
rettes from 1942 to 1968. The jury decided that Liggett Group, knowing that cigarettes were
potentially dangerous, falsely guaranteed in its advertising that its products were safe and
awarded $400,000 damages to the plaintiffs widower. The jury also decided that the company
failed in its duty to warn smokers of the health risk they were taking in using cigarettes until
warnings were legally required in 1966. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864 (D.N.J.
Aug. 22, 1988).
3. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), aff'd on
rehearing, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d
95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967). For a definition of assumption of risk,
see infra text accompanying note 208.
4. Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 865 (1963) (a cigarette manufacturer could be liable for a defective condition only if
the harmful consequences are, based on common knowledge, foreseeable).
5. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1335 (1970 & Supp. IV 1986)). In 1984,
Congress further amended the Act by the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984). Section 5(b) of the original 1965 Act read as follows: "No
statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes
the packages of which are in conformity with the provisions of this Act." 79 Stat. 282 (1965);
see also Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (Ist Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American
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While the cigarette smoker has encountered difficulty in maintaining a
suit against a cigarette manufacturer, this note suggests adding a new
plaintiff to the arena of tobacco litigation: the third party involuntary
smoker.6 This note demonstrates that a third party involuntary smoker who
contracts lung cancer, emphysema, or any hazardous disease as a result of
prolonged exposure to passive cigarette smoke, should be able to sue ciga-
rette manufacturers under the modern tort theory of enterprise liability.7
The first section of this note briefly examines the health risks faced by the
involuntary smoker and the recent social responses related to those risks.8
The second section examines tort theories that have led to the development
of enterprise liability.' An analysis of recent cases that have applied theo-
ries similar to enterprise liability will follow.10 The final section analyzes
asbestos cases that have imposed liability on the basis of enterprise
liability."
Modern tort theory has produced the relaxation of such rules as proper
defendant identification and causation. The relaxation of such rules has
provided an avenue of recovery for those injured by defective products. This
note proposes that an involuntary smoker should be able to assert a cause of
action against a cigarette manufacturer and recover under the enterprise
theory of liability.'"
I. HEALTH RISKS POSED BY EXPOSURE TO PASSIVE SMOKE
Recent scientific data and studies clearly indicate the significant health
risks posed by a nonsmoker's exposure to passive cigarette smoke.' 3 The
Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (lth Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp.
1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 907 (1987).
For an explanation of the preemption issue, see infra text accompanying notes 212-216.
6. An involuntary smoker is one who involuntarily inhales cigarette smoke as a conse-
quence of another's direct or active smoking.
7. See generally Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLo. L.
REV. 153 (1976). The basic premise of the enterprise theory of liability is that losses caused by
an enterprise or activity should be borne by those who have some logical connection with that
enterprise or activity creating the loss. Id. at 158. See infra text accompanying notes 95-207
for a more thorough analysis of enterprise liability.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 13-26.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 27-54.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 59-94.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 95-118. (Asbestos cases present an appropriate
application of the enterprise theory of liability due to the nature of asbestos related injuries).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 119-216.
13. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Health Consequences of In-
voluntary Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General 1986 [hereinafter Surgeon General's
Report]; Marshall, Involuntary Smokers Face Health Risks, 234 SCIENCE 1066 (Nov. 1986);
Hirayama, Non-Smoking Wives of Heavy Smokers Have a Higher Risk of Lung Cancer: A
Study from Japan, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 183 (1981); White & Froeb, Small Airways Dysfunc-
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Surgeon General's Report of 1986 has led to three major conclusions con-
cerning a nonsmoker's inhalation of passive cigarette smoke. First, involun-
tary smoking is a cause of lung cancer and other diseases in healthy non-
smokers; second, the children of parents who smoke compared with children
of nonsmoking parents have an increased frequency of respiratory infec-
tions, an increase in respiratory symptoms, and slightly smaller rates of in-
crease in lung function as the lungs mature; third, the separation of smok-
ers and nonsmokers within the same airspace may reduce, but does not
eliminate, the exposure of nonsmokers to passive smoke.' 4
According to the Surgeon General's findings, a substantial number of
annual lung cancer deaths occurring among nonsmokers are medically at-
tributed to involuntary smoking.'" Acute and chronic respiratory diseases
are also linked to exposure to passive smoke, and the evidence of this link is
notably strongest in infants.' The American Cancer Society estimates that
eighty-five percent of the more than 135,000 deaths from lung cancer in
1986 were directly attributable to active cigarette smoking.' 7 According to
the Surgeon General's report, even if the number of lung cancer deaths
caused by involuntary smoking is a small fraction of those deaths, there is
still a significant enough health risk to warrant substantial public concern.'"
The serious health risks posed by exposure to passive cigarette smoke
have significantly heightened public awareness. As of 1986, all but nine
states have some form of legislation restricting smoking in public places. 9
Most state laws restrict smoking in places ranging from public transporta-
tion to libraries. 20
Several states have also restricted smoking at the workplace.2 Many
lion in Non-Smokers Chronically Exposed to Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 720
(1980); Tager, Weiss, Rosner, & Speizer, Effect of Parental Smoking on the Pulmonary
Function of Children, 110 Am. J. EPID. 15 (1979).
14. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at 7.
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 270. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (1986) (The Arizona
legislature has declared smoking to be both a public nuisance and a danger to public health).
20. State laws most often restrict smoking in public transportation (35 states, see, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25948-25949.8 (West Supp. 1988)), hospitals (33 states,
see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D- II (West 1987)), elevators (31 states, see, e.g., ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01(A)(1) (1986)), indoor cultural or recreational facilities (29 states,
see, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-a (McKinney 1988)), schools (27 states, see, e.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-13-1 (Burns 1987), public meeting rooms (21 states, see, e.g., MICH.
ComP. LAws ANN. § 333.12601 (West Supp. 1988)), and libraries (19 states, see, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21b (West Supp. 1988)). Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at
269.
21. Twenty two states restrict smoking at the workplace for public sector employees
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cases have been filed by employees seeking injunctive relief from their em-
ployer. 2 In addition, an employee claiming she contracted lung disease
through exposure to passive cigarette smoke at her workplace brought a $4
million suit against her employer alleging that her employer failed to pro-
vide a safe workplace, and then discriminated against her as a handicapped
employee since her health hindered her ability to perform physically. 3
While Congress has enacted no federal legislation restricting smoking
in public places, a number of bills have been introduced since 1973.4 How-
ever, Congress recently approved legislation that bans smoking on domestic
airflights of two hours or less.25 Such legislation indicates substantial public
concern for the significant health risks posed by exposure to passive ciga-
rette smoke.2"
II. THEORIES OF TORT LAW PRECEDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Based on the theory of enterprise liability,27 an involuntary smoker
should be able to assert a cause of action against a cigarette manufacturer
for injuries caused by prolonged exposure to passive cigarette smoke. Nev-
ertheless, the involuntary smoker plaintiff would encounter several obstacles
in suing a cigarette manufacturer. First, since there are several cigarette
manufacturers, and such a plaintiff is likely to have been exposed to smoke
from several brands of cigarettes, he would be unable to identify a single,
specific defendant. Second, since there would be multiple defendants in
such a suit, a plaintiff would have difficulty proving causation. Before the
development of modern tort theories, an injured plaintiff who faced such
problems of proof could not assert a cause of action and recover for his
and nine states for private sector employees. Id. at 270. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-28
(West 1987); see also Comment, Limited Relief for Federal Employees Hypersensitive to
Tobacco Smoke: Federal Employers Who'd Rather Fight May Have to Switch, 59 WASH. L.
REv. 305 (1984).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 23, 146.
23. Environmental Exposure, Toxic Law Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 203 (July 22, 1987).
The suit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, sought injunctive and
monetary relief based on the plaintiff's claim that her employer negligently caused injury by
its continuing failure to provide her with a smoke-free environment. The suit stated that the
defendants knew or should have known that breathing passive cigarette smoke is harmful to
one's health and causes disease, including pulmonary disease. Id. Carrol v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
No. 87-1957 (D.D.C. filed March 7, 1988).
24. Surgeon General's Report, supra, note 13, at 266.
25. Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 328, 101
Stat. 1329-382 (1987).
26. Northwest Airlines recently became the first major airline to prohibit smoking on
all domestic flights. All Fired Up over Smoking, TIME, Apr. 18, 1988, at 64. For a further
discussion of social policy issues related to involuntary smoking, see infra text accompanying
notes 165-207.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 95-207.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss1/9
19881 THE INVOLUNTARY SMOKER 115
injuries. Over the years, however, theories of tort law preceding enterprise
liability have diminished some of the problems that plaintiffs face in suits
involving multiple defendants and suits in which precisely establishing cau-
sation is difficult.
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The development of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur"8 helps a plaintiff
prove negligence2 9 when he is injured as a result of an accident, but is una-
ble to prove who, if anybody, caused his injury. This doctrine gives rise to
the inference that in light of ordinary experience, someone must have been
negligent for an injury to have occurred. In order for the doctrine to apply,
the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant had exclusive control of the
instrumentality that caused the injury; and (2) the accident is one that ordi-
narily does not occur in the absence of negligence by the defendant.30 An
early case that applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co..31 An innocent plaintiff's inability to conclusively prove
the defendant's negligence in cases such as Escola provides a foundation for
the application of res ipsa loquitur and has had a persuasive effect in mak-
ing courts more willing to apply the doctrine.32 Moreover, the doctrine of
28. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
243 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. Historically, the Latin phrase means simply, "the
thing speaks for itself." This phrase originated in an English case in 1863 in which a barrel of
flour rolled out of a warehouse window and fell on a pedestrian. The principle is nothing more
than a reasonable conclusion, from the circumstances of an accident, that it was probably the
defendant's fault. Id.
29. The traditional elements necessary to prove negligence are: (1) A duty, or obliga-
tion, recognized by law, requiring a person to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the
protection of others against unreasonable risks; (2) a failure on the person's part to conform to
the standard of care required: a breach of duty; (3) a reasonably close causal connection be-
tween the conduct and the resulting injury, or "proximate cause"; and (4) actual loss or dam-
age resulting from a person's breach of duty. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 164.
30. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 457-58, 150 P.2d 436, 438
(1944).
31. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). In Escola, a waitress in a restaurant was
injured when a pop bottle exploded in her hand. Id. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437. The court held
that the injury was cause4 by either an excessive charge of gas or a defect in the glass, and
that neither cause would ordinarily have been present if the bottler had used due care. Id. at
459, 150 P.2d at 440. Consequently, the manufacturer was liable notwithstanding the fact that
the plaintiff could not prove the defendant's negligence. The court also eliminated the techni-
cal requirement of privity of contract by stating that the manufacturer is responsible for an
injury caused by a defective product to any person who comes in contact with it. Id. (Traynor,
J. concurring). Privity is the connection or relationship which exists between two or more con-
tracting parties, e.g., buyer and seller. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979).
32. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 255. See also Emerick v. Raleigh Hills Hospital-New-
port Beach, 133 Cal. App. 3d 575, 184 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1982) (plaintiff entitled to presumption
of liability even though instrumentality causing the injury was not within the "exclusive" con-
trol of the defendant); Oakdale Building Corp. v. Smithereen Co., 322 Il1. App. 222, 54
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res ipsa loquitur allows the risk of injury to be insured by the manufacturer
and the loss distributed to the general public as a cost of doing business."3
The purpose of imposing liability is to insure that the costs of injuries re-
sulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturer of the prod-
uct rather than by innocent "injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves. 34
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur also relaxes rules of causation. 5 The
plaintiff is seldom able to present direct evidence as proof of negligence due
to the obscure nature of the accident. Nevertheless, the doctrine is intended
to apply when circumstantial evidence indicates the probability that the de-
fendant's negligence is the most plausible explanation for the injury."
N.E.2d 231 (1944) (Res ipsa loquitur doctrine applicable where the apartment in good condi-
tion was given to exterminating company and a fire started in the apartment shortly after the
company employee left).
33. Justice Traynor, in his famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. stated:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences.
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune
to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the
public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace
to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the
manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is
responsible for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may occur
and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a consistent risk
and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection
and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.
Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J. concurring). See also Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of The Intellectual Foundations of Mod-
ern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola
set forth the framework for a strict product liability standard that was adopted by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court and the large majority of the United States jurisdictions nearly twenty
years later. Id. at 498.
34. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
35. The defendant's conduct is a cause of the plaintiff's injury if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing the harm about. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 267.
For an analysis of causation under enterprise liability, see infra text accompanying notes 126-
164.
36. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 257; see also Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154
P.2d 687 (1945). In Ybarra, the plaintiff suffered injuries during the course of an appendec-
tomy. Before the operation, the plaintiff had experienced no pain or injury to his right shoul-
der, but after awakening he felt sharp pain between the neck and shoulder. After his release
from the hospital, the condition grew worse and he developed paralysis and atrophy of the
muscles around the shoulder. Id. at 488, 154 P.2d at 688. The plaintiff argued the theory of
res ipsa loquitur. The defendants argued, however, that since there were several defendants,
there was a division of the responsibility in the use of the instrumentality causing the injury.
Thus, the injury might have resulted from the separate acts of one or more persons. Moreover,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 9
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Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur represents one major step in a grad-
ual trend of expanding tort liability theories to provide relief for injured
plaintiffs who are unable to either identify a specific defendant or prove
definite causation.37
B. Alternative Liability
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious and harm to the
plaintiff is caused by only one, the burden is on each defendant to prove
that he did not cause the harm.38 In order to assert this theory of liability
when injured by a defective product, the plaintiff is required to prove: (1)
that the defendants acted tortiously; (2) that the plaintiff was harmed by
the conduct of at least one of the defendants; and (3) that the plaintiff,
through no fault of his own, is unable to identify the specific manufacturer
that caused his injury.39
The alternative liability theory was first recognized in Summers v.
Tice.40 The plaintiff in Summers brought an action against two defendants
for injuries sustained in a hunting accident. 4 The court held that each de-
fendant was negligent but was unable to conclusively determine from which
defendant's gun the shots originated. The court expanded on traditional tort
principles holding that both defendants were jointly and severally liable for
several reasons. 42 First, the Summers court reasoned that practical unfair-
ness would result in denying the injured person redress because he cannot
prove how much damage each defendant caused, when it is certain that one
the defendants claimed that since the plaintiff made no showing as to which defendant caused
the injury, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not apply. Id. at 489, 154 P.2d at 688-89.
The court rejected the defendants' arguments, holding that it should be enough for the
plaintiff to show injury resulting from an external force applied while he lay unconscious in
surgery and that clearer identification could not be possible. Id. at 492-93, 154 P.2d at 690-91.
The court expanded the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because, if the defendants' arguments
were accepted, patients injured while unconscious would never recover for their injuries. Id.
37. See also Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929
(1975). Plaintiff was injured when a surgical instrument broke off in his spinal cord during an
operation. The court extended the Ybarra holding to a manufacturer and distributor. Id.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 B(3).
39. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 331-32, 343 N.W.2d 164, 173 (1984).
(Daughters of women who had taken DES during pregnancy and their spouses brought suit
against manufacturers of estrogen products. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that those
plaintiffs who demonstrated inability to identify the manufacturer of the product that injured
them and who sustained remaining burdens of proof could take advantage of the burden shift-
ing feature of alternative liability theory to withstand summary judgment on the causation
issue of negligence claims).
40. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
41. Id. at 82, 199 P.2d at 2 (both defendants were shooting in the direction of the
plaintiff when the plaintiff was hit with two shots, one in the eye and one in the lip).
42. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 3.
1988]
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of the defendants caused the harm.' s Second, the Summers court asserted
that relaxation of the proof required of the plaintiff is appropriate when he
is injured as a result of more than one independent force and is unable to
establish which force was the cause of this injury.4 Finally, the defendants
were ordinarily in a better position to offer evidence to determine between
them which one in fact caused the injury.' 5
Thus, instead of dismissing a plaintiff's cause of action against multiple
defendants for lack of proof against any of the defendants, courts have fol-
lowed a trend in relaxing traditional causation rules and permitting plain-
tiffs to recover against multiple defendants.' A shift in the burden of proof
to the defendants is appropriate when the plaintiff has proven a prima facie
case against the defendants. The court is then left with the alternative of
placing the loss on the culpable defendants rather than innocent plaintiffs.' 7
C. Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products
Traditionally, in order to recover damages a plaintiff injured by a de-
fective product was required to prove negligence" on the part of the manu-
facturer. In 1964, The American Law Institute adopted Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts which assigns liability to sellers for inju-
ries caused by products in a defective condition and unreasonably danger-
ous,' 9 though the seller has exercised all possible care in preparing the
43. Id.
44. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
45. -Id.
46. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 271. See also Kuhn v. Bader, 89 Ohio App. 203, 101
N.E.2d 322 (1951) (defendants found jointly and severally liable for injuries sustained by
plaintiff and caused by defendants negligently firing a high-powered rifle into a target with a
backstop composed of gravel); Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc., 330 S.W.2d 395 (Ky.
1959) (plaintiff sustained injuries when his vehicle was struck twice from the rear by three
negligent drivers, but was unable to prove which one. The court placed the burden of proof on
the issue of causation on the defendants).
47. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 271.
48. See supra note 29 for the elements required to prove negligence.
49. Whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous" depends on considerations of fore-
seeability, seriousness of injury, and costs of prevention. A plaintiff does not have to identify
and prove a particular failure to exercise reasonable care on the part of the manufacturer. Nor
can the defendant assert that the product was manufactured with reasonable care. Hall v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965) defines "defective condition" as, "where the
products is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965) defines "unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." A product is
defective if it is marketed in a way that makes it unreasonably dangerous for any of the
following reasons: (1) A flaw in the product that was present at the time the defendant sold it;
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 9
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product. 50 Thus, under Section 402A the plaintiff was no longer required to
prove negligent conduct on the part of the manufacturer in strict product
liability cases.
Three broad policy reasons convinced the courts to accept the theory of
strict liability in tort pronounced in Section 402A: First, the costs of inju-
ries due to defective products can be borne by manufacturers who are able
to shift the costs to purchasers by charging higher prices for the product.
Second, the adoption of strict liability promotes accident prevention and
eliminates the necessity of proving negligence. Finally, fault or negligence
in the manufacturing process is often present but difficult to prove.5 1 Conse-
quently, proof of such fault in the sale of a defective product was no longer
required under strict product liability. Thus, courts have adopted a less
stringent standard for the plaintiff when asserting a cause of action based
on a strict product liability theory by focusing not on the conduct of the
manufacturer but rather on the product itself. 52
Moreover, expansion of traditional tort principles has also resulted in
the extension of Section 402A to provide relief for bystanders who are in-
jured by defective or unreasonably dangerous products. 53 Courts have held
(2) a failure by the producer or manufacturer of a product to adequately warn of a risk or
hazard related to the way the product was designed; or (3) a defective design. PROSSER, supra
note 28, at 695.
50. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 695; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). Section 402A is stated as follows:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
Id.
51. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 693; Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363
A.2d 955 (1976). See also Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 681 (1980) for a critical analysis of the conventional justifications of strict lability.
52. See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Products Liability: An Interaction of
Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425, 429 (1974).
53. While the American Law Institute originally expressed no opinion as to whether §
402A extended to those other than users or consumers, many courts have extended the cover-
age of § 402A to bystanders injured by defective products. See Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co.,
257 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1977) (car went out of control in a school yard and ran over a child);
Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (patient in whose body
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that bystanders are entitled to greater protection than the consumer where
injury to a bystander from a defect is reasonably foreseeable.54 Thus, by
adopting strict liability and extending its protection to bystanders, the
courts have clearly followed the modern trend in expanding traditional tort
principles and providing relief for those injured by defective or unreasona-
bly dangerous products.
III. MODERN TRENDS
Modern tort theories are based on three general concepts. First, manu-
facturers are able to control the rate of product-related injuries by investing
in safety features or quality control, while consumers are basically power-
less to prevent injuries caused by modern and complex products.55 Second,
spreading the risk of product-related injuries through manufacturer pro-
vided insurance is justified in order to reduce the harshness of such a loss to
a specific individual.56 Finally, imposing liability on manufacturers for de-
fective products and forcing them to purchase insurance may be described
as "internalization of injury costs."15 7 Such an internalization policy will
produce incentives for manufacturers to make investments for research and
product safety.58 These three basic social policy considerations lay the foun-
dation for modern tort theory and the application of the enterprise theory of
liability.
A. Industry-Wide Liability
Under modern tort law, the theory of multiple defendant liability has
expanded to the extent of holding an entire industry liable for injuries re-
sulting from a defective product. The industry-wide liability theory holds an
entire industry jointly and severally liable to a plaintiff who cannot prove
which particular defendant manufactured the product that injured the
plaintiff.59 The industry-wide theory proposes a shift in the burden of proof
surgical needle broke was a "consumer" under § 402A); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.,
454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (motorcycle passenger's leg lacerated by Ben-Hur-type orna-
mental wheel cover protrusions on car manufactured by defendant); Jorgensen v. Meade John-
son Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (children born in mongoloid condition allegedly
due to altered chromosome structure in mother's body from defendant's birth control pills).
For a discussion of strict liability protection to bystanders, see Note, Strict Products Liability
to The Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 625 (1971).
54. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652, 657 (1969). See also cases cited supra note 53.
55. Priest, supra note 33, at 520.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 980 (1979).
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on the identification issues from the plaintiff to the defendant-manufac-
turer.6 0 The shift occurs if the plaintiff, through no fault of his own, is
unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the product that caused his
injury, but can prove factors tending to demonstrate that all of the defend-
ants manufactured a product similar to the injury-causing product.6 The
plaintiff is also required to show that all of the defendants adhered to an
insufficient industry-wide standard of safety and a probability that one of
the defendants caused the injury. 2
A case representative of the industry-wide liability theory is Hall v.
E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Company.63 The plaintiffs brought an action
for damages against explosive manufacturers and their trade associations
for eighteen separate accidents in which children were injured by blasting
caps. Plaintiffs' allegations were that the practice of the explosive industry
of not placing any warning upon individual blasting caps and the failure to
take other safety measures, although uniform throughout the industry, cre-
ated an unreasonable" risk of harm to third parties.6
The Hall court held that an entire industry may be held liable for
harm caused by the dangerous operations of one of its members.66 Although
the plaintiffs could not identify the specific manufacturer that caused their
injuries, the court shifted the burden of proving causation to the defend-
ants.67 However, the Hall court stated that the plaintiffs were still required
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the caps involved in the
accident were manufactured by one of the named defendants.6 8 Thus, the
court made it apparent that it required more than a showing of injury by
the plaintiffs.
The Hall court asserted that the main reasons for justifiably imposing
strict liability on manufacturers are "incentive" and "risk allocation. 169 In
addition, regardless of safety measures that manufacturers may take, inju-
ries will inevitably occur that may be wholly or partially caused by some
defect in the product. Such accidents are a statistically inevitable and fore-
60. Id. at 983.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
64. See supra note 49 for a definition of "unreasonably dangerous."
65. 345 F. Supp. at 358.
66. Id.
67. 345 F. Supp. at 379.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 368. Such a rule of strict liability is an incentive for manufacturers to maxi-
mize safe design, or a deterrence to dangerous design or manufacture. Id. See also Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260-63, 391 P.2d 168, 170-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896,
898-900 (1964); Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN.
L. REv. 587, 607-08, 631-36 (1969).
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seeable cost of the product's consumption and use.70 The purpose of impos-
ing industry-wide strict liability is to insure that the costs of such injuries
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured person who is powerless to protect himself.71 The
Hall court stated that imposition of strict liability theories such as industry-
wide liability was further justified because the theory protects injured plain-
tiffs and works no injustice to the defendants since they can adjust the cost
of such protection by including the cost of liability insurance in the price of
the product.7 2 Thus, based on a thorough analysis of social policy, fairness,
and justice, the decision in Hall was yet another progressive step in the
modern trend of expanding traditional tort theories that often left plaintiffs
without a remedy after being injured from defective or unreasonably dan-
gerous products.
B. Market Share Liability
Another modern theory of strict liability that holds an entire industry
liable for injuries caused by defective products is market share liability.
This form of multiple defendant liability is essentially the same as industry-
wide liability,73 except that liability is apportioned among the defendants in
accordance with their percentage of the relevant market."4 Under this the-
ory, the plaintiff must first prove that an injury was caused by a product
made identically by all the defendants. Second, the plaintiff must prove that
an injury was caused by the same type of product sold in a manner that
made it unreasonably dangerous. Third, the plaintiff must prove his inabil-
ity to identify the specific manufacturer of the product that caused the
plaintiff's injuries. Finally, the plaintiff must join enough of the manufac-
turers of the identical product to represent a substantial share of the
market.75
The California Supreme Court first adopted market share liability in
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.7 1 In Sindell the plaintiff was injured as the
result of diethylstilbestrol (DES) administered to her mother while the
mother was carrying the plaintiff during pregnancy. 77 Plaintiff brought an
70. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 368.
71. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
72. 345 F. Supp. at 375.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
74. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 714.
75. Id.
76. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
77. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a synthetic compound of the female hormone estrogen
and was administered to pregnant women for the purpose of preventing miscarriages. DES has
been found to cause cancerous vaginal and cervical growths in daughters exposed to it before
[Vol. 23
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action against eleven drug companies who manufactured DES on behalf of
herself and other women similarly situated. The plaintiff knew the type of
drug involved in the injury, but could not identify the specific manufacturer
of the product. 8 Over two hundred manufacturers produced DES.79 Conse-
quently, the plaintiff could not meet the traditional common law burden of
identifying a proper defendant. Furthermore, without a proper defendant
traditional tort principles posed a significant barrier to proving causation.
The Sindell court expanded existing tort theories to provide relief for
the plaintiff based on the basic premise that, "as between an innocent plain-
tiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the in-
jury." 80 The court noted that modern technology may create injuries caused
by defective products and that, as a result, the court was left with a choice;
to maintain rigid traditional tort principles and deny recovery to those in-
jured by such products, or to adopt a new theory to meet the changing
needs of society.81 The court also expanded on the rule in Summers v.
Tice82 by holding that the plaintiff need not offer evidence of causation
since the defendant's conduct played a significant role in the plaintiff's in-
ability to produce proof of harm.83 In addition, from a broader policy stand-
point, the court stated that the defendants were better able to bear the cost
of injuries caused by the manufacture of a defective product.8 The Sindell
birth because their mothers ingested it during pregnancy. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607
P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133. For a detailed discussion of DES and the effects of the
drug on its victims see Biebel, DES Litigation and the Problem of Causation, 51 INS. COUNS.
J. 223 (1984).
78. The eleven defendants joined in the suit manufactured a drug produced from a
formula identical to that which caused the injury. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 595, 607 P.2d 924,
925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133.
79. Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
80. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
81. The Sindell court cited Justice Traynor's famous concurring opinion in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944) as support. See
supra note 33 for Justice Traynor's opinion.
82. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
83. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
84. Id. The court held that it was reasonable to measure the likelihood that any of the
defendants supplied the injury-causing product by the percentage which the DES sold by each
of them bears to the entire production of the drugs sold for the purpose of preventing miscar-
riages. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court held, however, that
the plaintiff must join a substantial share of the DES market. If the plaintiff was forced to join
in the action a substantial share of the DES manufacturers from which her mother was likely
to have obtained the drug, the injustice of shifting the burden of proof to the defendants would
be greatly diminished. Finally, the court held that each defendant would be held liable for the
proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market. However, a defendant
could relieve itself from liability if it demonstrates it could not have made the product. While
the court adopted this theory to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of identifying a specific
defendant, the case was still in the pleadings stage. For a DES case in which a plaintiff re-
ceived a jury verdict, see Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450
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court modified the rules of causation and identification of a specific defend-
ant in applying the market share theory of liability. Consequently, the
courts have provided an avenue of recovery for injured plaintiffs who,
through no fault of their own, are unable to identify the specific manufac-
turer that caused their injury. 5
The market share theory of liability adopted in Sindell has drawn crit-
icism from both legal scholars and commentators.8" However, additional
criticism persuasively generating strong arguments against the imposition of
market share liability is addressed in the Sindell dissent. First, the dissent
stated that the holding violated well established rules of causation requiring
that there be some reasonable connection between the defendant's act and
the injury sustained by the plaintiff."' The dissent reasoned that the long
standing tradition of tort principles and rules of causation were substan-
tially eroded in that the plaintiffs joined only five of the approximately two
hundred drug companies that manufactured DES.88 According to the dis-
sent, the possibility that any of the named defendants actually caused the
plaintiffs' injuries were purely speculative and conjectural.8 9
In addition to expressing concern about the departure from the tradi-
tional principles of tort law, the dissent also focused on the social utility of
the drug and argued against the majority's application of market share lia-
bility. The social and economic benefits derived from utilizing the econ-
omy's resources in the fight against disease and reducing costs of medical
care are enormous and the development of new drugs produces many social
N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). See also Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944) for further social policy
reasons justifying the imposition of strict liability. See supra note 33, for an excerpt of Justice
Traynor's opinion.
85. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984). Plaintiffs in
this case were also injured daughters whose mothers ingested DES while pregnant. While the
court did not apply the market share theory established in Sindell, the court did adopt a
modified rule of alternative liability as established in Summers. The court held that the plain-
tiff must show; (1) that the defendants acted tortiously; (2) that the plaintiffs have been
harmed by the conduct of one of the defendants; and (3) the plaintiffs, through no fault of
their own, were unable to identify the specific manufacturer that caused the injury. The court
stated that if the plaintiffs met these requirements they could be able to avail themselves of the
DES modified alternative liability theory and would be relieved of the traditional burden of
proving causation in fact. Id. at 332, 343 N.W.2d at 173. However, this case was also in the
pleadings stage and the court explicitly reserved judgment as to the validity of a potential jury
verdict. Id. at 340, 343 N.W.2d at 177.
86. See generally Note, supra note 59; Fisher, Products Liability-An Analysis of Mar-
ket Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981); Comment, Manufacturer's Liability
Based on a Market Share Theory: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 16 TULSA L.J. 286 (1980).
87. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 614, 607 P.2d 924, 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 146 (Richard-
son, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
89. Id.
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benefits. 0 The dissent also emphasized that the court imposed liability for
the manufacture of a drug that was carefully tested and had the full ap-
proval of the United States Food and Drug Administration.9 The dissent
argued that if a drug has beneficial purposes for the majority of the users,
but only a small fraction of users experience harmful side effects, liability
should not be imposed since such liability will inevitably inhibit the re-
search, development, and dissemination of new pharmaceutical drugs.9
Such liability, the dissent reasoned, is wholly inconsistent with traditional
tort theory. 3
As a result of the expansion of modern tort theory in Sindell, those
people injured by defective drugs but unable to identify a specific defend-
ant-manufacturer were provided with an avenue of recovery. However, the
market share theory may seem to have some negative social ramifications,
particularly in the pharmaceutical industry. If the imposition of such liabil-
ity results in decreased incentive for research, development, and manufac-
turing of new drugs, courts may take cognizance of such consequences and
may refuse to adopt the theory. 4
C. Enterprise Liability as Applied in Asbestos Litigation
The basic premise of the enterprise theory of liability is that losses
ought to be borne by those who have some logical connection with the en-
terprise or activity creating the loss.95 The theory considers such factors as
the relationship between product manufacturers and consumers, the role of
internalizing costs to affect accident levels, and the most effective methods
of distributing the risk of loss.9" An effective way for society to decide how
to allocate its limited resources in order to satisfy the greatest number of its
members' individual wants and desires is through an open competitive mar-
90. Id. at 619, 607 P.2d at 941-42, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50.
91. Id. Moreover, the dissent took cognizance of the fact that the incidence of vaginal
cancer among "DES daughters" was estimated at one-tenth of one percent to four-tenths of
one percent.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also Namm v. Charles E. Frosst Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121
(App. Div. 1984) (The court refused to modify proper defendant identification requirements in
the absence of legislative or higher court authority). For other DES cases in which the court
refused to apply the Sindell market share theory of liability, see Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514
F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla.
1982); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982); Zafft v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984).
95. The enterprise liability theory applies to losses historically recoverable under tort
law when caused by an enterprise or activity, such as the production and distribution of prod-
ucts. Klemme, supra note 7, at 158.
96. Priest, supra note 33, at 463.
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ket system. 97
Cases involving asbestos related injuries present a justifiable basis for
the application of enterprise liability.98 Two recent cases that applied this
theory are Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.99 and Lockwood v. AC &
S, Inc..00 In Hardy,' the court applied principles of market share liability
outlined in Sindell.'0 As with DES cases, asbestos-related injuries present
causation problems for the plaintiff because the latency period, or the
length of time between exposure to the product and the resulting injury,
makes it legally and medically impossible to state with certainty which as-
bestos exposure caused or contributed to the disease.103 Nevertheless, courts
have relaxed traditional tort law principles to redress the significant injuries
sustained by asbestos victims. The plaintiff's burden of proving causation
has consequently been modified. Courts only require that the plaintiff prove
exposure to the product and resulting injury, then the burden shifts to the
defendants to isolate causation and exculpate themselves.104 If the defend-
ants are unable to do so, liability is apportioned among the defendants in
accordance with their percentage share of the relevant market.
Courts impose liability in asbestos cases even though asbestos has sig-
nificant social utility in an industrialized society.'05 The potential harm
posed by exposure to asbestos, however, is similarly significant. 08 Thus,
courts are often faced with a classic utility versus danger analysis. 107 Never-
97. The underlying justification for the enterprise liability theory is based on a premise
of classical economics, in recognizing that at any one point in time the total resources available
to a society are limited. Klemme, supra note 7, at 158-59.
98. More than 67,000 lives are taken each year by asbestos related injuries. Comment,
Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 55 (1978).
99. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
100. 44 Wash. App. 330, 722 P.2d 826 (1986).
101. The plaintiffs, consisting of insulation workers, pipefitters, carpenters, and factory
workers, had contracted asbestosis as a result of prolonged exposure to asbestos. 509 F. Supp.
at 1354. For a detailed explanation of this fatal disease, see Note, The Causation Problems in
Asbestos Litigation: Is There an Alternative Theory of Liability?, 15 IND. L. REv. 679 n.5
(1982). Asbestos is an insulation material which consists of hydrated silicate minerals which
occur naturally as masses of fibers and is relatively indestructible and highly resistant to fire.
Id.
102. See supra text accompanying note 75.
103. Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1355.
104. Id. at 1357.
105. Asbestos is highly useful in insulation and pipe covering because of its heat resis-
tant property. In addition, the U.S. industry alone consumes one million tons of asbestos annu-
ally. Id. at 1355.
106. See supra note 98.
107. In applying this analysis, the court weighs the social utility of the product against
the probability and seriousness of potential harm or danger that the product poses to society.
For a further discussion of social utility versus risk of harm see infra text accompanying notes
165-83.
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theless, courts justify the imposition of liability based on an analysis of so-
cial policy considerations.
First, the imposition of liability will result in a wide distribution of the
risks of product-related injuries because manufacturers can include the
costs of insurance in the price of the product. This result is justified when
one considers the harshness of forcing innocent victims to bear such
costs.108 Second, manufacturers are in a better position than the consumer
to avoid such injuries by conducting research to discover new dangers and
reduce the danger that defective products present to society.109 Finally, the
burden of illness and death that result from dangerous products such as
asbestos should be placed upon those who profit from placing such products
on the market. 110
Consequently, courts relax the plaintiff's burden of proving causation
not only for such social policy reasons, but also because it is practically
impossible for the plaintiff to determine which particular exposure to asbes-
tos dust caused his injury.1 As a result of the cumulative nature of asbes-
tosis, identifying a specific causative agent is inconsistent with traditional
legal concepts of causation.' Thus, circumstantial evidence may present a
sufficient basis for imposing liability under the enterprise theory of
liability. 13
Courts have used the enterprise theory to impose liability in other
cases involving asbestos related injuries. 4 As in Hardy, the defendants in
108. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 205-06, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982).
109. Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
110. Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549.
111. In Lockwood, the court stated that the sufficiency of the evidence to prove causa-
tion was a factual determination that is up to the jury to decide. Lockwood, 44 Wash. App.
330, 353, 722 P.2d 826, 840. Direct evidence in such cases is not necessary, and circumstantial
evidence may provide the entire basis for recovery. Inferences drawn from the testimony estab-
lished that if the asbestos products were located in the shipyard where the plaintiff worked,
they were actually used on the jobsite. First, the expert testimony tended to prove the existence
of asbestos fibers in the air because of the product's ability to drift and remain in the ambient
air for long periods of time once it is released into the air. Second, the plaintiff had asbestosis,
which is only caused by exposure to asbestos dust. Third, the testimony of co-workers that
asbestos products were on the job site tended to prove that the plaintiff was exposed to the
asbestos dust. Id. at 353, 722 P.2d at 840.
112. Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1358.
113. Testimony of the plaintiff, and testimony of co-workers who rely on memory with
regards to products used over a twenty year period may be all the evidence that is available.
Id. at 1358-59.
114. See Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 330, 722 P.2d 826 (1986). The
plaintiff worked in Seattle shipyards from 1942 to 1972 when he took disability retirement
after being diagnosed as having asbestosis. Id. at 332-33, 722 P.2d at 829. Until 1952, the
plaintiff had worked in nearly every shipyard in the area and had been exposed to similar
amounts of asbestos from job to job. From 1952 to 1972 he had worked at the same location
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Lockwood unsuccessfully argued that the plaintiffs were unable to specifi-
cally identify the defendants' products as the ones to which they were di-
rectly exposed, and thus failed to establish proximate cause."15 Neverthe-
less, courts have applied the enterprise theory of liability based on an
analysis of social policy" ' holding that accepting such an argument would
present an impossible task for a plaintiff who suffers asbestos related inju-
ries."1  Consequently, courts have expanded on traditional tort theory to
provide a plaintiff with a realistic probability of recovery.118
IV. THE INVOLUNTARY SMOKER
WARNING: The Surgeon General has determined that cigarette smoking
is dangerous to your health and the health of others."9
Based on the basic theory of enterprise liability, an involuntary smoker
should be able to assert a cause of action against a cigarette manufacturer
for injuries due to prolonged exposure (a period of years) to passive ciga-
rette smoke. The purpose of this section is to outline the stages that an
involuntary smoker plaintiff must pursue to assert a cause of action against
cigarette manufacturers and to address the problems a plaintiff may con-
front in such a suit.
120
and had similar exposure there. His work consisted of direct contact with insulation workers
who installed or removed asbestos materials. Also noteworthy was the fact that the plaintiff
had smoked cigarettes from his early teens until 1972, because asbestos exposure combined
with cigarette smoking presents a greater potential for health complications. Id. at 334, 722
P.2d at 830. The original complaint named nineteen defendants, of which all but three were
dismissed or settled prior to appeal. The plaintiff claimed that the asbestos manufacturers were
strictly liable for placing an unreasonably dangerous product on the market which was not
accompanied by an adequate warning. Id.
115. Id. at 352, 722 P.2d at 839. The court ruled that there was sufficient credible
testimony or inferences which could be drawn therefrom to establish that if the asbestos prod-
ucts were located in the shipyard they were actually used on the jobsite. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 98-114.
117. Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 330, 354, 722 P.2d 826, 840 (1986).
118. Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 330, 722 P.2d 826 (1986); Hardy v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981); Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
119. Note, The Non-Smoker in Public: A Review and Analysis of Non-Smokers'
Rights, 7 SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 141, 172 (1979).
120. In order to present an effective analysis, the author wishes to make it clear that
there are limited situations that would provide an opportunity to present such a case. Such
situations would include an employee exposed to passive cigarette smoke at the workplace for a
prolonged period of years, or a child raised in a home in which both parents were heavy smok-
ers. Much of the analysis of this section focuses on the plaintiff in the workplace since such a
situation would provide for a more appropriate application of the enterprise liability theory. In
the situation where a child raised by parents who were heavy smokers would be the plaintiff,
identification would not present significant problems since the parents are likely to remember
what brand of cigarettes they smoked over the years. Since the inability to identify a specific
defendant is an essential part of enterprise liability, the plaintiff in the workplace would pre-
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A. Identifying the Proper Defendant
In order for an involuntary smoker plaintiff to assert a cause of action
against a cigarette manufacturer, he must join the proper manufacturers as
defendants. The key problem of proof in DES and asbestos cases is the
inability of the plaintiff to identify a precise causative agent.12' Similarly, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, for an involuntary smoker plaintiff to
identify which specific cigarette brand caused his lung cancer, since all cig-
arettes consist of virtually the same carcinogenic agents and toxic
compounds. 2'
A plaintiff in such situations is not at fault for failing to identify a
specific defendant. Consequently, courts fashion a way around product
sent a more appropriate analysis because he was most likely exposed to smoke from many
brands of cigarettes.
121. Perhaps the most persuasive argument against imposing liability based on an enter-
prise theory is the selection of fewer then all manufacturers as defendants. This argument is
most tenable in DES cases since there are over two hundred companies that manufactured
DES. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 609, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). As a result, a plaintiff may find it impractical,
perhaps impossible, to join all potential tortfeasors in one cause of action. Those who are op-
posed to the application of enterprise liability in DES cases offer several arguments against
allowing fewer than all potential tortfeasors.
First, if just one tortfeasor is absent, and it is he who actually caused the harm, then the
other defendants may be held liable even though they are innocent. Comment, DES and a
Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963, 991 (1978). Second, a
standard of proof depends on the joinder of all defendants, and joining fewer than all defend-
ants destroys any presumption of liability. Id. Finally, the plaintiff should be at fault for fail-
ing to identify the proper defendants since the mother's choice of drug, doctor, pharmacist,
and such records were all more within the control of the plaintiff than of the defendants. Id. at
992.
Those in favor of imposing liability on DES manufacturers offer several responses to re-
fute such arguments. First, once the plaintiff meets the burden of joining the required defend-
ants, the defendants can in turn file a cross complaint against other DES manufacturers which
they allege may have supplied the injury-causing products. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607
P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Second, if only a small portion of DES manufacturers
dominated the market, joinder of only these manufacturers has a great probability of constitut-
ing the most responsible parties. Comment, supra note 121, at 984-85. Such a standard is
logical since it is virtually impossible for all potential causes of an event to be before the court,
and a court must be satisfied with the most probable causative agents. Id. at 992. Finally, the
failure of the plaintiff to identify a proper defendant is due largely to the fault of the DES
manufacturers. The very tortiousness of the defendants' conduct in failing to discover or warn
of the dangers of the drug was the reason that all parties failed to keep records or remember
the drug prescribed, since they were unaware of any need to do so. Id. at 993.
122. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at 169, 252. Undiluted sidestream smoke
(smoke emitted from a smoldering cigarette) is characterized by significantly higher concen-
trations of the toxic and carcinogenic compounds found in mainstream smoke (smoke that the
smoker inhales from the cigarette) including ammonia, volatile amines, volatile nitrosamines,
certain nicotine decomposition products, and aromatic amines.
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identification, a traditional requirement of proof in products liability.12 The
traditional rule would place an impossible burden on plaintiffs, particularly
in asbestos cases, since the victim has little or no opportunity to identify
products used twenty or more years earlier. 2"
In contrast, however, the burden of identifying all potential tortfeasors
would not present a problem to an involuntary smoker plaintiff. Since there
are only fourteen cigarette companies,125 a plaintiff would not face an un-
due burden in joining all defendants. Thus, all responsible parties would be
before the court, and any concerns that the guilty party is not present are
unwarranted, so long as the plaintiff is able to provide evidence establishing
a link between his lung cancer and prolonged exposure to passive cigarette
smoke.
B. Causation
In order for an involuntary smoker to assert a cause of action against a
cigarette manufacturer, he must be able to prove causation. Causation
would present the most significant and salient issue in such a case. Simply
stated, the defendant's conduct is a cause of the plaintiff's injury if it was a
material element and a substantial factor in bringing the harm about.'2
Such a statement is undoubtedly more complex than it appears. There is
nothing in the entire field of tort law that has elicited such overwhelming
confusion, and there is yet to be any general agreement as to the best ap-
proach to a solution.'27 Consequently, proximate cause must be determined
on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense,
justice, policy, and precedent.'28 A court must conduct a thorough analysis
of many social policy issues in cases where causation is difficult to precisely
establish. This section addresses those issues and shows that, based on the
enterprise theory of liability, courts should follow the recent trend in re-
laxing rules of causation and provide relief for an involuntary smoker.
123. Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1358. See also Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418
Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984); Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 330, 722 P.2d
826 (1986).
124. Lockwood, 44 Wash. App. at 354, 722 P.2d at 840.
125. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1987 724
(107th ed.) Washington, D.C. 1986.
126. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 267. If the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor
in causing the plaintiff's injury, it follows that he will not be absolved from liability merely
because other causes have contributed to the result, since such causes, innumerable, are always
present. Id. at 268.
127. Id. at 263.
128. Id. at 279.
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Plaintiffs in DES cases face significant burdens in proving causation
due to the nature of the product and the nature of the plaintiffs' injuries.
One of the main problems in the DES cases was the passage of time be-
tween the mother's ingestion of the drug and the discovery of DES-associ-
ated abnormalities in the offspring.'29 In addition, twenty-nine percent of
the reported adenocarcinoma cases apparently occurred even though the pa-
tient's mother did not ingest DES. Thus, it was not clear in all cases of that
particular disease associated with DES use that DES was actually the
cause."' Also, although doctors prescribed synthetic estrogens for millions
of pregnant women between the late 1940s and 1971, only 389 reported
cases of clear cell adenocarcinoma have been reported in the offspring of all
women born throughout the world during that period. 13' Finally, the inci-
dence of vaginal cancer among "DES daughters" was estimated at one-
tenth of one percent to four-tenths of one percent. 3 However, the inci-
dence of the types of cancer linked with DES is extremely rare in persons
other than DES daughters. 13
Plaintiffs in asbestos cases faced similar, although not as substantial,
burdens of proving causation. Again, such problems are related to the na-
ture of the product and the type of injury involved. The latency period of
asbestosis makes it legally and medically impossible to determine with any
degree of certainty when the disease was contracted or which exposure
caused or contributed to the disease."' Such a condition is due to many
years of exposure to asbestos dust, with past and present exposures contrib-
uting to the disease."35 Consequently, it is virtually impossible for a plaintiff
to prove which exposure or exposures caused his disease.
Similar to the plaintiffs in DES and asbestos cases, the involuntary
smoker faces a significant burden of proving causation due to the cumula-
tive effect of exposure to passive cigarette smoke and the nature of diseases
such as lung cancer. One factor in favor of the asbestos plaintiff is that only
exposure to asbestos causes asbestosis.11" On the contrary, while it has
129. Biebel, supra note 77, at 226. For example, adenocarcinoma has a latency period of
ten to twenty years. Id. at 227 (citing Note, DES: Judicial Interest Balancing and Innovation,
22 B.C. L. REV. 747, 749 (1981)).
130. Fischer, Products Liability: An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1623 (1981).
131. Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REV. 695, 713
(1981).
132. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 620, 607 P.2d 924, 942, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 150, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
133. Biebel, supra note 77, at 225.
134. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
Asbestosis is a slow and cumulative disease. The continued exposure to asbestos dust and fibers
increases the risk and severity of the disease. Id.
135. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1973).
136. Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 330, 353, 722 P.2d 826, 840 (1986).
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clearly been established that involuntary smoking causes lung cancer,' it
is not certain that all people who contract lung cancer have been exposed to
passive cigarette smoke for prolonged periods of time. In addition, the na-
ture of lung cancer and other related diseases reflects numerous factors
such as genetic make-up, occupation, age, diet, and exposure of a person
during his life to a complex mixture of bacteria, viruses, radiation, and
chemicals. 38 Moreover, more data on the dose and distribution of environ-
mental tobacco smoke exposure in the population are needed in order to
accurately estimate the magnitude of the risk in the U.S. population." 9
Despite the apparent causation problems an involuntary smoker plain-
tiff is likely to encounter, courts have followed a current trend by relaxing
traditional rules of causation in order to provide relief for plaintiffs in DES
and asbestos cases.'4 0 Broadly stated, liability in these cases arises from the
presumption that each defendant is a cause because, jointly, there is a high
probability that the product manufactured by one of the defendants, all of
whom behaved tortiously, caused the plaintiff's injury. 4 ' In addition, cir-
cumstantial evidence may establish the entire basis for recovery under neg-
ligence or strict products liability"42 since such evidence may be all the
plaintiff has to offer. A plaintiff need not establish with absolute certainty
that the defendant caused his injury. He must simply persuade the jury by
a preponderance of the evidence that his injury occurred in the manner he
contends that it did.143 Thus, as in Hardy, the Lockwood court imposed
liability based on presumptions and circumstantial evidence. In Hardy, the
137. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at 13.
138. Orloff, Theories of Cancer and Rules of Causation, 27 JURIMETRIcS J. 255, 256
(1987).
139. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at 107.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 76-118.
141. Comment, supra note 121, at 998.
142. Lockwood, 44 Wash. App. at 354, 722 P.2d at 840-41.
143. The court in Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 330, 722 P.2d 826 applied
the following standard:
It is sufficient if his [the plaintiff's] evidence affords room for . . . reasonable minds to
conclude that there is a greater probability that the accident causing the injury happened
in such a way as to fix liability upon the person charged with such liability, than it is that
it happened in a way for which the person so charged would not be liable. There are very
few things in human affairs . . . that can be established with such absolute certainty as
to exclude the possibility, or even some probability, that another cause or reason may
have been the true cause or reason for the damage, rather than the one alleged by the
plaintiff. But such possibility, or even probability, is not to be allowed to defeat the right
of recovery, where the plaintiff has presented to the jury sufficient facts and circum-
stances surrounding the occurrence as to justify a reasonable juror in concluding that the
thing charged was the prime and moving cause. In other words, the plaintiff is only re-
quired to satisfy the jury, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the accident . ..
occurred in the manner he contends it did.
Id. at 355, 722 P.2d at 841.
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court relied on the worker's testimony, and testimony of co-workers who
relied on memory with regard to asbestos products used over a twenty or
thirty year period.' Similarly, the Lockwood court held that there was
sufficient credible testimony or inferences that could be drawn to establish
the presumption that if asbestos products were located in the shipyard, they
were actually used on the jobsite, and did not remain in the warehouse. 45
Similar to the plaintiffs in the DES and asbestos cases, an involuntary
smoker would not face an insurmountable burden in establishing a lessened
but requisite causal connection between his lung cancer and prolonged ex-
posure to passive cigarette smoke.14 On a broader but perhaps more signifi-
cant scale, an involuntary smoker suing cigarette manufacturers for dam-
ages can rely on physicians' testimony along with other circumstantial
evidence to establish causation. 147 When an injured party shows that he
worked at a certain job for a period of years, that there was cigarette smoke
on the jobsite, that this could be verified by the employer and co-workers,
and provides the testimony of physicians confirming that the plaintiff's lung
cancer was due substantially to prolonged exposure to passive cigarette
smoke, he would fit the standard set forth in Lockwood.148 Circumstantial
evidence would lead a reasonable juror to conclude either that the plaintiff's
prolonged exposure to passive cigarette smoke was a substantial factor in
bringing about cancer of the lung, or that there is a greater probability that
the lung cancer was due to the prolonged exposure to passive smoke than to
other factors."49
Opponents of enterprise liability argue, however, that the relaxation of
the rules of causation abandons the traditional requirement of a causal con-
nection between the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's injury. 50 Thus, op-
ponents of enterprise liability argue that since only a small number of po-
tential defendants are joined, it remains wholly speculative and conjectural
whether any of the named defendants in fact caused the plaintiff's inju-
144. Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1358.
145. Lockwood, 44 Wash. App. at 352, 722 P.2d at 839.
146. See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone, 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch.
Div. 1976). The plaintiff relied on affidavits of attending physicians who confirmed her sensi-
tivity to cigarette smoke and the negative effect it had on her health. Id. at 520-21, 368 A.2d
at 410.
147. See also Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex.
1981); Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 330, 722 P.2d 826 (1986). In both cases the
court allowed the plaintiff to offer circumstantial evidence to prove causation and imposed
liability on the defendant manufacturers.
148. Lockwood, 44 Wash. App. at 355, 722 P.2d at 841. See supra note 143 for the
standard the court applied in Lockwood.
149. Lockwood, 44 Wash. App. at 355, 722 P.2d at 841.
150. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
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ries. 151 These arguments are not without merit, particularly in the DES
cases. 152 This argument loses plausibility, however, even in DES cases,
when the court's analysis is premised on the theory of enterprise liability.
Under the enterprise theory of liability, the standard of "clear and con-
vincing evidence" is satisfied by joining those manufacturers that accounted
for a high percentage of the defective products on the market, approxi-
mately seventy-five to eighty percent. 158 In addition, relaxing rules of causa-
tion in the asbestos cases is justified by the fact that since the disease of
asbestosis is cumulative, exposure to all asbestos products contributes sub-
stantially to the plaintiff's overall condition."
Similarly, due to the cumulative nature of lung cancer, exposure to the
smoke from all brands of cigarettes contributes substantially to the overall
result of lung cancer. Over thirty years of research has conclusively estab-
lished cigarette smoke as a carcinogen, and it is certain that a substantial
portion of all lung cancers that occur in nonsmokers is due to exposure to
passive cigarette smoke. 15 5 Also, a number of American and foreign courts
allow plaintiffs to use statistical or epidemiological evidence to prove that
their injuries resulted from exposure to a carcinogen. 56 Epidemiological
statistics may constitute the best, if not the sole, available evidence in cases
where a causal link is difficult to precisely establish since it is impossible to
pinpoint the actual cause of the disease.15 7
Consequently, relaxed rules of causation are proper in cases involving
injuries that may have been caused by more than one factor. In a nuclear
test blast case, a federal district court in Utah recognized that cancer re-
sults from a multiplicity of factors, and that the law does not necessarily
recognize only one proximate cause of an injury.158 This standard is simi-
larly reflected in Agent Orange cases, where courts have ruled that a plain-
tiff must show that it is "more likely than not" that his disease was caused
by exposure to the chemical. 5 ' Similarly, the same test is applicable to an
151. Id.
152. Very few DES cases have reached trial, and only one has resulted in a jury verdict
for the plaintiff. Biebel, supra note 77, at 226.
153. Comment, supra note 121, at 996.
154. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1105 (1973).
155. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at x.
156. See In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980);
Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980) (asbestos); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (chemical
wastes); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (smoking
and cancer).
157. In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 834
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
158. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 412 n.155 (D. Utah 1984).
159. Orloff, supra note 138, at 260.
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involuntary smoker case, since lung cancer may be the result of more than
one source. Thus, when a plaintiff proves a prolonged period of exposure to
passive smoke (i.e. at the worksite), a jury could reasonably conclude that
"more likely than not" the lung cancer was a result of heavy exposure to
passive cigarette smoke.
Relaxing the rules of causation is even further justified in the involun-
tary smoker case. As opposed to the high number of DES and asbestos
manufacturers, there are only fourteen cigarette companies. 160 Thus, if a
plaintiff proves injury from prolonged exposure to passive smoke, a pre-
sumption of liability is justified because, since all manufacturers can feasi-
bly be joined, there is a 100% probability of causation collectively.' 6'
Moreover, due to the nature of enterprise liability, and the nature of
the injury involved, a relaxation of the rules of causation is not only justi-
fied under current trends, but is also appropriate to provide a plaintiff with
a remedy. Products liability law is dynamic and should not stand still where
innocent victims face "inordinate difficult problems of proof."'' The modi-
fication of the rules of causation imposes liability and compensates victims
in proportion to the likelihood that they were injured by the defendant's
conduct.
Finally, under traditional rules of causation, defendants can more read-
ily escape liability and thus lack incentive to conduct research into injury
causation.16 3 Thus, imposing liability will encourage defendants to conduct
research as to the ways in which their products endanger the public so that
they may potentially escape liability by exculpating themselves.16 4
1. Social Utility v. Magnitude of Risk
In any products liability case in which causation is a significant issue, a
court must weigh the balance between the social utility of the product and
the magnitude of the risk involved.' 6 5 A court will hold that a product is
160. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987, supra note 125, at 724.
161. Comment, supra note 121, at 986.
162. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 579-80, 436 N.E.2d 182, 185, 450
N.Y.S.2d 776, 779 (1982). But cf. Priest, The Monsanto Lectures: Modern Tort Law and Its
Reform, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 1 (1987) (suggesting that modern tort theory has adversely af-
fected the welfare of United States citizens).
163. Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules For Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 894 (1982).
164. Id. As to either manifest injustice or inexact justice, the law should prefer the
latter. Id. at 895. In Sindell, the court adopted market share liability and imposed liability on
the defendants as opposed to maintaining rigid traditional tort principles and denying relief to
the injured plaintiff. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132.
165. Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Experts in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1974). The issue in a products liability case
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"unreasonably dangerous"'"6  and therefore impose liability only if, on bal-
ance, the utility of the product does not outweigh the magnitude of the
danger.16
7
While there was undoubtedly a high magnitude of risk involved in the
use of DES and asbestos, the utility of such products was also substan-
tial. 68 Consequently, opponents of enterprise liability argue that the threat
of liability will discourage people from engaging in useful but potentially
dangerous activities.'69 However, this concern loses its significance in the
context of an involuntary smoker case. Cigarettes and the activity of smok-
ing have an insignificant social utility value,170 while the risks they pose to
society are overwhelming.' 7' Perhaps the only plausible social utility that
cigarettes may have is the industry's effect on the economy. In adopting the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,'172 Congress sought to
strike a balance between warning the public of the hazards of cigarette
smoking and protecting the interests of the national economy.17
However, the risks involved with the use of cigarettes are overwhelm-
ing. 7 4 Besides the array of harms that direct cigarette smoking poses, pas-
is whether, given the risks and possible benefits of and possible alternatives to the product,
society will live with the product as it is or will require an altered, less dangerous form. Id.
Although automobiles cause thousands of deaths each year, their social utility is so significant
that society permits their use.
166. See supra note 49.
167. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 (1973).
168. The dissent in Sindell argued that the social and economic benefits in fighting the
war against disease and reducing medical care costs are enormous. Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 619, 607 P.2d 924, 941-42, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 149-50, cert. denied 449
U.S. 912 (1980). Since the incidence of vaginal cancer in DES daughters was estimated at less
than percent, the dissent argued that if a drug is beneficial to the majority of its users but
later has harmful side effects to only a small fraction, the enterprise theory of liability simply
goes too far in imposing liability on the manufacturer. (The court analyzed the case on the
basis of market share liability. However, since market share liability is an inherent part of
enterprise liability, the author makes no distinction). Similarly, products containing asbestos
and its heat resistant property have significant utility in an industrial society. Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
169. Fischer, supra note 130, at 1629.
170. One might argue that in a free society one should have the right to smoke, just as
one has the right to read pornographic material. However, when one reads Hustler or Pent-
house, he does not immediately and directly endanger the health of others, as one does when
he smokes in public places.
171. See infra note 174.
172. See supra note 5.
173. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3rd Cir. 1986).
174. Smoking causes the deaths of more than 350,000 Americans annually. Levin, supra
note 1, at 198. Evidence consisting of over 50,000 studies establish cigarette smoking as the
single largest preventable cause of premature death and disability in the United States. Sur-
geon General's Report, supra note 13, at ix. Cigarette smoking has also been established as a
major cause of cancer of the lung, larynx, oral cavity, esophagus, bladder, and is associated
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sive smoke poses similarly significant dangers. Over thirty years of studies
have established cigarette smoke as a carcinogen. 7 5 Undiluted sidestream
smoke (smoke emitted from a cigarette between puffs) contains higher con-
centrations of many of the toxic and carcinogenic compounds found in
mainstream smoke (the smoke the cigarette smoker inhales while puffing
from a cigarette). 176 Also, existing data suggest that more carcinogenic ac-
tivity per milligram of cigarette smoke may be found in sidestream smoke
than in mainstream smoke. 77 Passive smoke contains irritants that can
damage the conjunctiva of the eyes, the mucous membranes of the nose,
throat, and respiratory tract and creates poor air quality indoors.' 78 Finally,
children of parents who smoke are hospitalized for bronchitis and pneumo-
nia during the first year of life more than children of nonsmokers. More-
over, the children of parents who smoke suffer a variety of acute respiratory
illnesses, such as bronchitis, tracheitis, and laryngitis before two years of
age at a higher frequency than children of nonsmoking parents . 7
Congress and the state legislatures, in recognition of the dangers of
cigarette smoking and the harmful effects it has on society, have passed
legislation that regulates cigarette smoking. Forty states and the District of
Columbia have some form of legislation, regulation, and voluntary action
that restricts smoking in various public settings.8 0 Smoking in the work-
place has also been regulated. Legislation in twelve states regulates smok-
ing by government employees, and nine states and over seventy communi-
ties regulate smoking in the private sector workplace.' 8' Arizona was the
first of several states to pass a law declaring smoking to be both a public
nuisance and a danger to public health. 18' Such policies may alter public
with cancer of the liver and pancreas. U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare,
Smoking and Health, Report of the Surgeon General, ch. 5 at 31, 36, 42, 44, 49, 53 (1979)
[hereinafter Smoking and Health]. From a broader social utility standpoint, cigarettes pose a
significant risk by causing fires and property damage. According to the United States Fire
Administration, cigarettes cause approximately 93,000 fires a year, resulting in more than
2,100 deaths, 3,900 injuries and more then $300 million in property damage. Podgers, Attack
on Cigarettes as Fire Cause Grows, 67 A.B.A. J. 282, 283 (1981).
175. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at x.
176. Id. at 169.
177. Id. at 252.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 107.
180. Id. at xi. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25948 (West Supp. 1988)
(prohibiting smoking on public transportation).
181. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at 324. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:3D-23 (West 1987) (prohibiting smoking in places of employment, except in designated
areas).
182. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (1986). In addition, it has been argued that
people have a constitutional right to a smoke-free environment. See Reynolds, Extinguishing
Brushfires: Legal Limits on the Smoking of Tobacco, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 435, 451-55 (1984).
An amendment to the U.S. Constitution that recognizes an inalienable right to a decent envi-
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attitudes about smoking and may contribute to a reduction of smoking in
the United States.183 Courts should follow the trend of state legislatures
and public sentiment by recognizing the rights and health of nonsmokers by
allowing a cause of action by an involuntary smoker, thereby imposing lia-
bility on cigarette manufacturers for injuries caused by prolonged exposure
to passive cigarette smoke.
2. Other Policy Considerations
When analyzing issues of causation, courts also consider broad social
policy implications and the ramifications of imposing liability or denying
recovery. The enterprise theory of liability is concerned with the conserva-
tion of the community's limited resources.' 8' When accidents or injuries oc-
cur, the judicial system must determine how those losses should be distrib-
uted. Such an analysis of loss distribution must involve establishing a
standard for determining how the initial burden should be allocated be-
tween the parties as well as how the ultimate burden will be allocated
among the various segments of society." 5
The enterprise theory presupposes that as people carry on their lives
they ought to be permitted to rely on normal expectations. 86 One such nor-
mal expectation is that all activities will be conducted in such a manner
that will not disrupt the normally expected status quo by causing tort-like
losses that will frustrate the normal expectations of other community
members . 8 7
The enterprise theory operates on the premise that an enterprise should
take appropriate preventive action to avoid losses as a result of personal
injury or, in the alternative, insure against those losses that will inevitably
ronment has been proposed by Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin. Note, supra note 119, at
169-70. A bar in Chicago recently went so far as to ban smoking on its premises every
Wednesday night. Kay and Conklin, Ins, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 21, 1987, § 4, at 3, col. I.
Finally, public opinion polls indicate strong support in favor of banning smoking in a wide
range of public places. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at 324.
183. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 13, at 324.
184. Klemme, supra note 7, at 175.
185. Id. at 177.
186. Id. at 180.
187. Id. For example, one should be entitled to normally expect that, if he crosses an
intersection when the light is green, another driver will not ignore a red light and cross the
intersection from the right or left. If the cars crash, resulting in physical injury and property
damage, the normal expectations of the driver who had the green light are disrupted. Simi-
larly, the presence of cigarette smoke arguably affects the normal expectations of nonsmokers.
Many people avoid public places such as nightclubs, restaurants, and sporting events because
cigarette smoke causes discomfort. Cigarette smoke causes clothes and hair to smell, irritates
the eyes and throat, and often makes breathing difficult. In addition, people sensitive or aller-
gic to cigarette smoke may be forced to seek medical attention to alleviate their symptoms.
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occur. 88 This in turn requires a determination of who may be the most
effective preventer of injuries and who can most efficiently distribute the
costs of such injuries. 1 9 Often, however, these entities are not one in the
same. The entities in an enterprise include manufacturer, distributor, em-
ployee, and the consumer. Clearly the most effective preventers of harm
inflicted on involuntary smokers are the smokers themselves. However, it is
also necessary to determine how effective the cigarette manufacturer can be
in preventing harm to involuntary smokers.
There are several ways cigarette manufacturers could attempt to pre-
vent the harms posed to involuntary smokers. First, they could make ciga-
rettes less harmful and reduce the risks involved by producing only filtered
cigarettes. Filtered cigarettes, however, still pose a significant health threat
and would not eliminate the risk posed to involuntary smokers, 190 since fil-
ters only protect the smoker. Cigarette manufacturers could also provide
warnings on the labels to warn of the harmful effects of exposing others to
passive smoke.291 Such a warning presumably would not be very effective,
however, since involuntary smokers do not use the product and would have
no reason to read the label. In addition, even if the nonsmokers would read
such a labeled warning, they still are forced to involuntarily inhale passive
cigarette smoke.
Nevertheless, these precautions would not eliminate the risk of expo-
sure to passive smoke. Thus, injuries to involuntary smokers are simply an
unavoidable and inevitable result of a lawful, or "not illegal" enterprise, the
cigarette industry. These losses, however, should be borne by those who de-
rive some fairly direct economic gain or benefit from carrying on an enter-
prise that poses significant health risks to nonsmokers.' 9'
The initial burden of bearing such a loss would fall on the cigarette
manufacturers. Such a result compensates the injured plaintiff and does no
injustice to the cigarette manufacturers, since they can distribute the loss
among the purchasing consumers of the enterprise as a cost of doing busi-
ness. 93 Thus, if liability is placed on the cigarette manufacturer, it can
spread the costs of insurance on to the consumers of the product, the
smokers.
Opponents of enterprise liability argue that such a theory extends too
far in providing potential plaintiffs with an avenue of recovery.' However,
188. Id. at 181.
189. Id. at 183.
190. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 174, at 14-29.
191. See, e.g., warning given supra note 119 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 95.
193. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
194. Note, supra note 59, at 1011.
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if the involuntary smoker plaintiff were forced to bear the loss, inequity
would result. While the plaintiff may have some form of casualty insurance,
an insurance claim would improperly shift the burden of compensation to a
group consisting of those who buy medical casualty insurance rather than
the cigarette industry.195 A purchasing consumer of goods and services,
such as those who purchase medical and casualty insurance, should not be
expected to bear the burden of a loss caused by an enterprise, the cigarette
industry, which fails to meet normal expectations unless he is a purchasing
consumer of that enterprise. 90 To force purchasing consumers of casualty
insurance to pay for losses caused by the cigarette industry is contrary to
the conservation of a community's limited resources, since the costs of in-
surance would not be reflected as accurately as possible in the pricing struc-
ture of the goods produced by the enterprise that actually caused the in-
jury.197 Consequently, the enterprise theory of liability properly places the
economic burden of purchasing insurance on the manufacturers of the in-
jury-causing enterprise, and ultimately on its consumers. 198
Another countervailing policy concern in enterprise liability is protect-
ing the manufacturer from unduly burdensome liability. 9 Involuntary
smoker plaintiffs, however, are not likely to be significant in number. People
are unlikely to begin suing cigarette manufacturers for damages as a result
of smelly clothes or temporarily irritated eyes.200 A more likely case would
involve a serious injury where an involuntary smoker contracts lung cancer,
emphysema, or some other fatal disease as a result of being exposed for
prolonged periods (years) of time. Since causation is a significant hurdle,20'
such cases are unlikely to arise frequently.
Also, principles of enterprise liability are traditional in that they are
apparent in other tort law areas such as respondeat superior and vicarious
liability.' 0z The rationale of enterprise liability is also analogous to cases
195. Klemme, supra note 7, at 198.
196. Id. at 208-09.
197. Id. at 188. Thus, if an involuntary smoker plaintiff were forced to bear the loss, he
would be forced to collect through his casualty insurance company. As a result, those who
purchase casualty insurance would be forced to pay higher premiums for a loss caused by the
cigarette industry. If the cigarette industry were forced to bear the loss, the loss would ulti-
mately be reflected in the price of the cigarettes, a more logical and fair result since the
cigarette industry was the cause of the injury.
198. Id. at 189.
199. Biebel, supra note 77, at 243.
200. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a court to impose sanctions against
those who file frivolous lawsuits. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 126-64.
202. In a vicarious liability case, an employer is held liable not because he violated a
standard of care, but because, despite reasonable precautions, his employee violated the appli-
cable standard of care. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 376.
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involving workmen's compensation. 20 3 Cigarette manufacturers choose to
participate in an industry that puts an unreasonably dangerous2° product
on the market and thus should bear the costs of harm done to involuntary
smokers, since such injuries are typically associated with the cigarette
industry.
The enterprise theory of liability involves highly significant and com-
plex social and economic issues. Opponents of such a theory argue that such
solutions are more properly within the province of the legislature. 20 5 How-
ever, any products liability case involves the application of a standard which
cannot be specifically codified but must require the considerations and
weighing of a number of factors based on a case by case basis. 06 Such
factors include an analysis of the social policy factors outlined in this
note.207 Only then can a court reach an equitable and fair decision that the
enterprise theory of liability seeks to achieve.
C. Potential Barriers
1. Assumption of Risk
One potential barrier an involuntary smoker plaintiff may face is the
defense of assumption of risk. A plaintiff may not recover in a strict prod-
uct liability action for an injury received when he voluntarily and unreason-
203. In such cases courts focus not on the employer's fault but rather on the risk that
may be fairly regarded as typical to the enterprise he has undertaken. Id. (quoting HARPER
AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 26.7 at 1376-78 (1956)).
204. See supra note 49.
205. Comment, supra note 121, at 1007. The author does not wish to propose any legis-
lation on the effects of involuntary smoking, but simply suggests judicial standards that would
provide an injured involuntary smoker with an avenue of recovery.
206. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837
(1973). Professor Wade considers the following factors to be of significance in applying the
standard in a products liability case:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not
be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product with-
out impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid the danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
Id.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 120-206.
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ably encounters a known danger.20 8 Defendants consistently assert this de-
fense in asbestos cases.209
Since one generally must work to earn a living, the argument that one
unreasonably210 exposes himself to cigarette smoke while working in an of-
fice is simply untenable. Employees exposed to cigarette smoke at the work-
site have successfully sued their employer for injunctive relief and have re-
futed the defense of assumption of risk.2 11 Consequently, an involuntary
smoker plaintiff would appear to have little difficulty in surmounting the
potential hurdle of the defense of assumption of risk, since cigarette smoke
is not the by-product of any office job. Nonsmokers do not unreasonably
expose themselves to the risk of contracting lung disease when there is ciga-
rette smoke in the office where they are employed.
2. The Preemption Issue
Federal circuit courts have recently held that the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state common law tort actions by
cigarette smokers. 2 These recent suits have been brought by cigarette
smokers against cigarette manufacturers for lung cancer and other smoking
related illnesses. Plaintiffs in recent suits have relied on the theory of failure
to warn of the dangers of cigarette smoking as a cause of action. Based on
the holdings of these recent cases, however, the preemption doctrine argua-
bly applies only to suits brought by users of the products, i.e. the cigarette
smokers. In Palmer v. Liggett=3 the court held that a suit for damages
based on a common law theory of inadequate warning is preempted as frus-
trating the purposes of Congress when the warning complies with the Fed-
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
209. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The defendants contended that the plaintiff knew of the dangers
of the asbestos products in connection with his insulation work, appreciated the danger, and
with such knowledge assumed the risk by continuing his work. Id. at 1098. The court rejected
this argument and held that such a defense applies in a strict products liability action only
where the plaintiff's conduct is voluntary and unreasonable. Id.
210. Unreasonable: Irrational, foolish, unwise, absurd, silly, preposterous, senseless, stu-
pid. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1379 (5th ed. 1979).
211. See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone, 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch.
Div. 1976). A telephone company secretary sought an injunction requiring the employer to
enact a smoking ban on the job. In upholding the injunction, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that cigarette smoke is not a natural by-product of New Jersey Bell Telephone's
business, and cannot be regarded as a risk which the plaintiff has voluntarily assumed in pur-
suing a career as a secretary. Id. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411.
212. See Palmer v. Liggett, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands,
825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J.
1984), rev'd and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
213. 825 F.2d 620.
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eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.2 14 In addition, the court fo-
cused on the fact that smoking, at least initially, is a voluntary act, and that
in other cases where state remedies were not preempted, the victims had
little or no choice in their participation in the regulated fields. 15
While a suit by an involuntary smoker could potentially be based on a
failure to warn of the hazards of cigarette smoke, since the labels on ciga-
rette packages only mention the hazards of direct or active cigarette smok-
ing, the Act should not preempt a suit based on an enterprise theory of
liability since the failure of an adequate warning is not a relevant issue."
Because cigarette smoke exists in virtually all public places ranging from
restaurants to sports arenas, a person exposed to passive cigarette smoke
has little or no choice but to confront the danger, unless he never leaves his
home, or lives and stays in an isolated rural area.
V. CONCLUSION
The hazards of cigarette smoking have been documented for over
twenty years, and it is commonly known that smoking is dangerous to a
person's health and causes cancer. Recent studies have found that smoke
emitted from cigarettes poses a similar health hazard to nonsmokers. Smok-
ers can choose to quit; nonsmokers have no choice and are often forced to
breath passive cigarette smoke and risk severe health consequences.
This note has analyzed the basis and principles of the enterprise theory
of liability and has proposed that a nonsmoker who suffers a severe injury
due to prolonged exposure to passive cigarette smoke should be able to as-
sert a cause of action and recover against the cigarette manufacturers.
Modern industry has produced many useful and beneficial products for so-
ciety, yet unfortunately industry has also produced defective 17 products
that have caused significant injuries to both those who use them and those
who come into contact with them. As a result, modern tort theories have
developed and expanded over the years to provide injured victims with a
remedy against the manufacturers of such products. Often, injured plain-
tiffs are unable to accurately establish causation and are unable to identify
a specific defendant through no fault of their own.
214. Id. at 626.
215. Id. at 627. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (nuclear
energy development); United Construction Workers v. LaBurnum Construction Corp., 347
U.S. 656 (1954) (employment).
216. A full discussion of the preemption issue is beyond the scope of this article. For an
excellent analysis, see Comment, Common Law Claims Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette
Warnings Preempted under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965: Ci-
pollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 754 (1986).
217. See supra note 49 for a definition of "defective."
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The enterprise theory of liability is an expansion of modern tort law
that allows plaintiffs a chance of recovery. Such a theory provides relief for
a plaintiff injured by prolonged exposure to passive cigarette smoke. If ciga-
rette manufacturers choose to put an unreasonably dangerous 18 product on
the market which causes injury to society, they should pay for the inevita-
ble harm that will result from its use and bear the initial burden of such a
loss. Cigarette smokers will likely bear the ultimate burden if they are
forced to pay for the loss when it is reflected in the increased price of the
product. Such a result is equitable since the cigarette smokers pose a threat
to the health of nonsmokers and are partially at fault when injuries occur.
The enterprise theory of liability has been applied to cases involving
DES and asbestos and has achieved fair and equitable results. An involun-
tary smoker has yet to enter the arena of tobacco litigation, but victory is
possible through the theory of enterprise liability.
BRADLEY M. Soos
218. See supra note 49 for a definition of "unreasonably dangerous."
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